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Mergers of equals are often considered simply symbolic. Whereas exist-
ing literature on the topic views equality as underscoring the importance of 
distributive justice, power, or identity, the role of culture remains relatively 
obscure. In this study, the authors explore equality as a dynamic construct 
associated with two major processes in mergers of equals: cultural clash 
and cultural construction. The authors employ a qualitative case study with 
interviews and analysis of company materials from BroadBand, a wireless 
Internet access provider, to address the role of culture and equality in merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&A). The results shed light on how and why social 
actors entering into mergers may enact a culture of equality. First, fi rms may 
develop new aspirations and patterns of appreciation and initiate practices 
and strategies that construct equality as an integral part of the merger. Sec-
ond, when distributive equality becomes a liability, it incites change. In the 
context of equality, this change results in strategic action that transforms the 
meaning of “a merger of equals” to a more practical, pragmatic, and inte-
grative equality, which takes into account the interests and the needs of the 
merged fi rm. Third, contrary to the common skeptical and cynical portrayal 
of mergers of equals, this study found equality to be a crucial factor during 
postmerger integration. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.




 ere is a tip for deal making: When 
companies start talking about a 
‘merger of equals,’ someone is usu-
ally getting the better deal” (http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/
business/yourmoney/25deal.html). This cyn-
ical quote from the New York Times’ A. Sorkin 
on the merger of XM Satellite Radio with 
Sirius Satellite Radio speaks to the popular 
myth that a merger between “equals” means 
that both companies receive not only equiva-
lent stock shares, but equivalence in all as-
pects of the merger such as resource sharing, 
dividing tasks and responsibilities, and shared 
management positions. In short, a merger of 
equals cultivates expectations of wide busi-
ness synergies as well as fairness, mutual trust 
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in each other’s intentions and deeds, and the 
presentation of a united front (e.g., Cart-
wright & Cooper, 1993; Risberg, Tienari, & 
Vaara, 2003; Schweiger, Csiszar, & Napier, 
1994; Vaara & Tienari, 2002; Zaheer, Scho-
maker, & Genc, 2003). As Zaheer et al. 
pointed out (2003), “By defining a merger as 
being between equals, an expecta-
tion of distributive equality may be 
created, in which the parties ex-
pect that every aspect of the 
merger will be equal, rather than 
one of integrative equality, where 
on balance, each side will gain in 
some areas and lose in others” 
(italics in original; p. 186). Al-
though distributive equality pro-
vides clear-cut opportunities and 
advantages for mergers, the chal-
lenge of maintaining such equal-
ity is considerable. Meyer and 
 Altenborg (2007) present vivid 
evidence of the difficulties in-
volved in maintaining equality in 
their study of a merger between 
two Scandinavian state-owned 
communication firms. In this 
case, the perceptual and structural fallacies 
caused the principle of equality to harm so-
cial integration and instead produced a disin-
tegrative effect. 
Cultural differences may hamper merg-
ers of equals. A notable example is the 
Daimler-Chrysler merger, originally de-
scribed as a merger of equals (Cook, 1998). 
The operational and managerial differences 
of the German and the American compa-
nies ended with the German approach 
dominating (Vlasic & Stertz, 2000). Conse-
quently, Chrysler employees were 
disillusioned with what they perceived as 
Daimler’s attempt to alter their basic as-
sumptions, values, and beliefs (cf. Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 
2006; Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & 
Weber, 1992; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). In 
general, cultural differences work against 
equality because the resulting clashes un-
dermine employees’ shared understanding 
of every aspect of the organization, from 
strategy to employment practices. 
Here we investigate cultural conflict as a 
cause for abandoning the notion that a 
merger can be a “merger of equals.” The guid-
ing propositions are as follows: First, the fail-
ure to implement distributive equality in a 
merger of equals could occur because mem-
bers of dominant firms are less likely to expe-
rience cultural clashes and may more readily 
identify with a merger that favors their own 
cultural terms (cf. van Knippenberg & van 
Leeuwen, 2001; van Leeuwen, van Knippen-
berg, & Ellemers, 2003; Zaheer et al., 2003). 
Second, cultural practices and conventions 
during postmerger integration highlight var-
ied meanings of equality for different organi-
zational actors. Third, cultural practices and 
conventions emerge out of the different lega-
cies of the two merged organizations. In 
mergers of equals, these differences may be 
overlooked, thus preventing the goal of equal-
ity being realized. Thus, we address the 
 question of how cultural clashes lead to aban-
doning the notion of distributive equality as 
the model for a merger.
This article fills a gap in the literature on 
culture and M&As by addressing the issue of 
how and why actors entering into mergers of 
equals may enact, contest, or accept norms 
and practices of equality (e.g., Ambrose & 
Cropanzano, 2003; Citera & Rentsch, 1993). 
It demonstrates how equality can become a 
liability during a merger and shows how the 
case study organization responded by chang-
ing the meaning of a merger of equals to one 
encompassing a more practical and prag-
matic integrative equality. Furthermore, con-
trary to cynical portrayals of mergers of 
equals, we suggest that integrative equality is 
a crucial factor during integration. Integra-
tive equality has a direct impact on the strat-
egies of action and practices used during 
integration and reinforces certain cultural 
values over others, allowing for flexibility 
during integration. 
Our study is based on research conducted 
in 2004 and 2005 at BroadBand,1 a leading 
Internet communications company special-
izing in broadband wireless access. The com-
pany was created in 2001 through what 
management declared was a merger of equals. 
Collecting data at both 3 and 4 years after the 
In short, a merger 
of equals cultivates 
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merger enabled us to capture the period of 
cultural integration and to detect changes in 
the notion of equality over time. The ratio-
nale for our postevent approach is that it is 
only with the perspective of time that the 
aftermath of the merger is clearer to those 
who participated in the process of integrat-
ing. Thus, we used both current and retro-
spective narratives aimed at reconstructing 
the meaning of equality in the merger. Pre-
merger experience provided a backdrop 
against which to interpret changes in equal-
ity during postmerger integration. 
In the next section, we review the rele-
vant scholarly literature concerning our theo-
retical perspective on equality and culture. 
We then outline our research setting and 
method for collecting and analyzing data. 
Our empirical results follow, grouped by ana-
lytical clusters that emerged around the 
theme of a merger of equals: (a) forms of jus-
tification, (b) notions of equality, (c) cultural 
factors, and (d) changes in equality practices. 
We then present the theoretical implications 
of our findings and discuss limitations of the 
study. Our conclusion outlines further impli-
cations of our work for the study of mergers 
of equals as well as the role of culture in 
organizations.
Contexts of Equality: Cultural 
Differences in Mergers of Equals
A key factor in mergers of equals is the no-
tion of justice or fairness in the way firms 
distribute resources and shape the process of 
managerial practices and decision-making 
(Deiser, 1994; Lipponen, Olkkonen, & Moil-
anen, 2004; Meyer & Altenborg, 2007; Zaheer 
et al., 2003). If members of merged organiza-
tions perceive the merger as just, this signals 
willingness to commit to the new organiza-
tion. Organizational justice scholars, particu-
larly Novelli, Kirkman, and Shapiro (1995) 
differentiated between two types of justice: 
distributive justice or “the feelings of fairness 
surrounding the allocation of organizational 
resources” and procedural justice, which 
complements the former and refers to the 
procedures and processes associated with the 
ongoing operation of the organization 
(p. 300). The presence of these two types of 
justice indicate a willingness of the parties to 
engage with each other with fairness, often 
based on equality. Studies examining the 
issue of equality in M&As, however, have 
concluded that in the end, and in particular, 
during postmerger integration, 
the principle of equality is not 
sustainable (Hambrick & Can-
nella, 1993; Meyer & Altenborg, 
2007). Thus, the rule of distribu-
tive justice, which implies a fair 
outcome for all (Leventhal, 1976), 
is difficult to create and maintain 
in M&As because of the inherent 
differences associated in both the 
initial conditions of the merger 
and the dynamics of postmerger 
integration (Marks & Mirvis, 
1992). 
In particular, Weber and Cam-
erer (2003) identified culture as a 
prime reason companies experi-
enced problems in mergers of 
equals. This is because culture “af-
fects how the everyday business 
of the firm gets done…how priorities are set 
and whether they are uniformly recognized, 
whether promises that get made are carried 
out, whether the merger partners agree on 
how time should be spent, and so forth” 
(p. 401). The thorny cultural aspects of merg-
ers focused our theoretical lens on the way 
equality is practiced during a merger of 
equals. Our approach differs from other stud-
ies that have dealt with the issue of equality 
in M&As. We depart from Meyer and Alten-
borg (2007), who focused on theories of orga-
nizational justice, and Vaara and Tienari 
(2002), who studied how management posi-
tions were allocated as a manifestation of 
power relations. Our conceptual framework 
is more aligned with Zaheer et al. (2003), who 
claimed that the notion of a merger of equals 
changes meaning during the postintegration 
period by creating “integrative rather than 
distributive” views of equality (p. 190). We 
argue that the operationalization of equality 
is best understood through a cultural lens. 
Despite extensive research on culture in 
M&As, a gap remains in our understanding of 
A key factor in 
mergers of equals is 
the notion of justice 
or fairness in the 
way firms distribute 
resources and 
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how equality is implemented over time. 
Given the importance of cultural dynamics 
in shaping both the value and practice of 
equality, this is an important oversight. 
Largely, cultural perspectives on post-
merger integration focus on cultural differ-
ences to explain the consequences 
of bringing together organizations 
with different values, beliefs, and 
practices (Buono & Bowditch, 
1989; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 
2006; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Lars-
son & Lubatkin, 2001). Studies in 
this tradition variously support 
arguments that cultural attributes 
predict better postmerger perfor-
mance (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 
1998) or worse performance (Chat-
terjee et al., 1992); indeed, reviews 
and meta-analyses have found in-
conclusive results (Stahl & Voigt, 
2008; Teerikangas & Very, 2006). 
These studies tend to treat culture 
as a set of monolithic attributes, 
however, implying that an organi-
zation’s members share durable 
meanings that are embedded in 
the organizational culture and re-
sist change when disrupted (e.g., 
Harrison & Carroll, 2006; Ranft, 
2006; Ranft & Lord, 2002).
This literature also tends to 
view culture during postmerger integration 
as an outcome of a premeditated integration 
approach (e.g., Bower, 2004; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Morosini & Singh, 1994; Na-
havandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Schweiger, 
2002). Although the extant literature on cul-
ture clashes is overly deterministic, the con-
structionist approach posits that the impact 
of culture on postmerger integration is best 
explained through the discursive and sense-
making traditions of cultural theory (e.g., 
Gertsen, Soderberg, & Torp, 1998; Hellgren et 
al., 2002; Riad, 2005; Soderberg & Holden, 
2002; Vaara, 2000, 2002, 2003; Vaara & Tien-
ari, 2002). In this view, the merged cultures 
are social constructs that reflect both the con-
text of identity construction and the social 
organization of meaning in postmerger inte-
gration. As Soderberg and Holden (2002) 
stated, a “social constructionist approach to 
culture implies that so-called cultural data are 
inevitably ‘social constructs’ made on the 
basis of the practitioners’ and the researchers’ 
own cultural thought patterns and the con-
cepts and categories they are socialized with” 
(p. 112). This approach is contextually sensi-
tive and assumes that cultural construction is 
premised on mechanisms such as narratives, 
sensemaking, and identity construction be-
fore and during the integration (Vaara, 2000; 
Vaara & Tienari, 2002; van Knippenberg, van 
Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002; van 
Knippenberg & van Leeuwen, 2001). 
The “culture clash” hypothesis in organi-
zational studies claims that culture clashes 
are detrimental to postmerger integration 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1993) and merger suc-
cess (Datta, 1991). Cultural differences be-
tween merging organizations have been 
found to be negatively associated with the 
commitment of the acquired firm’s top man-
agement to the merger’s success and with the 
acquiring firm management’s cooperation 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992; DeNisi & Shin, 2004; 
Krug & Nigh, 2001; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; 
Weber, 1996; Weber & Schweiger, 1992). In a 
merger of equals, we assume that conflict 
may be strongest when management of one 
firm is responsible for determining the goals, 
strategic choices, and key operations of post-
merger integration. Either party losing voice 
elicits a sense of inequality and ultimately af-
fects the commitment and cooperation of the 
party that perceives the merger as failing to 
fulfill its basic tenet of equality (Schweiger & 
Goulet, 2000). Resolving culture clashes in a 
merger of equals, therefore, is particularly 
crucial for top management teams, whose 
motivation and commitment to the merger 
have a major influence on employee motiva-
tion (Sales & Mirvis, 1984; Schweiger & Very, 
2003). 
Furthermore, in a merger, the inertial ten-
dencies of culture may eventually lead to a 
sharp demarcation between the cultures of 
the merged firms, as each attempts to pre-
serve its initial values and practices. Particu-
larly in unequal mergers, the dominant 
culture may be perceived as threatening and 
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(Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Marks & Mirvis, 
1997). In a merger of equals, the ethos of 
continuity may minimize cultural differences 
and lead members to identify with the new 
firm (Bartles, Douwes, de Jong, & Pruyn, 
2006). Although members’ shared experi-
ences during postmerger integration may 
allow the principles of equality to either 
weaken or strengthen, when there are large 
cultural differences between the firms, an 
erosion of equality is likely. To preserve per-
ceptions of equality, top managers must cater 
to the cultural sensitivities of the merged 
firms and actively build an integrated culture 
that narrows the gap between the firm’s 
 cultures. 
Vaara (2003) contended that pluralism 
and ambiguity are embedded in the post-
merger integration process and should be 
embraced. Indeed, the notion of culture as a 
fragmented entity (Martin, 1992, 2002) sug-
gests that pluralism and ambiguity may well 
be the hallmark of cultures in postmerger 
integration contexts. Furthermore, ambiguity 
is likely to facilitate identity change during 
postmerger integration, as Corley and Gioia 
(2004) showed. We claim that new cultures 
created in mergers of equals are both con-
tested and negotiated because organization 
members are likely to seek to maintain the 
basic identities and values of their legacy or-
ganizations. It is this struggle for a sense of 
equality, or accepting inequality, that is re-
constructed by creating a postmerger integra-
tion culture that reflects the realities of an 
unsettled organizational period (Swidler, 
1986). 
Creating the new culture is not likely to 
follow a formal definition of a merger of 
equals, but rather involves processes of reaf-
firming and legitimizing the values that re-
flect the cultures and identities of the parties 
to the merger. Although van Knippenberg et 
al. (2002) contended that premerger and 
postmerger identification are “more closely 
aligned for members of the dominant organi-
zation” (p. 247), premerger identities may 
serve as a repertoire for constructing differ-
ences that are embedded in the new identity 
of the merged organization. The current 
study concerns the processes that unfold 
around culture and identity shifts in a merger 
of equals, highlighting patterns in how the 
principle of equality is negotiated and re-
drawn.
As Weber (1996) claimed, culture clashes 
are not necessarily confrontations between 
two sets of assumptions, norms or values, but 
are essentially identity conflicts. 
Creating the new culture can lead 
members of the subordinate orga-
nization to feel they are being 
forced to abandon their premerger 
identity, leading to feelings of 
threat, resistance, dismay, alien-
ation, hostility, or apathy toward 
the other organization (e.g., Terry 
& Callan, 1998; Vaara, 2002; van 
Leeuwen et al., 2003). Mergers 
and acquisitions research high-
lights various mechanisms that 
may smooth negative dynamics 
during postmerger integration, in-
cluding preserving premerger 
identities (Larsson & Lubatkin, 
2001), achieving congruence in 
terms of acculturation between 
the merged firms (Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1993), promoting 
synergy (Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999; Sirower, 1997), and increas-
ing awareness of cultural com-
patibility between the firms 
(Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1993). 
Furthermore, mergers redefine group 
boundaries and may create pressure for mem-
bers to amend the notion of equality by 
 negotiating, contesting, and incorporating 
legacy identity attributes, processes that may 
transcend competition and encompass con-
flict, ambiguity, or shock stemming from the 
merger (e.g., Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Cart-
wright & Cooper, 1993, 1996; see Gioia, 
Schultz, & Corley, 2000 for an empirical ex-
ample). Negotiating equality as the prima 
facie logic of the merger is embedded in 
members’ sense of meaning and supports a 
sense of continuity (Bartles et al., 2006; van 
Knippenberg & van Leeuwen, 2001; van 
Leeuwen et al., 2003). In other words, mem-
bers who strongly identify with the idea of 
equality may be more open to integration if 
We claim that new 
cultures created 
in mergers of 
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they perceive some form of equality in the 
new organization. Equality could then serve 
as a focal point for negotiating strategies of 
action during integration (Zaheer et al., 2003) 
because it provides a map for what is legiti-
mate and acceptable and informs practices 
and action, including adopting procedures, 
routines, and knowledge. Thus, focusing our 
research on equality and culture should pro-
vide a better understanding of mergers of 
equals and how norms of distributive justice 
are modified, contested, and accepted during 
postmerger integration. The case of Broad-
Band, a pioneering communications firm cre-
ated out of a merger of equals, provides a 
unique case analysis to illustrate our asser-
tions about the role of equality in M&As.
The Research Setting: Broadband
The BroadBand merger represents an exam-
ple of Napier’s (1989) type of “collaborative 
merger,” which refers to mergers undertaken 
“to generate gains to both [firms] or to one, 
through a blending of operations, assets or 
cultures, or through an exchange of technol-
ogy or other expertise” (p. 277). BroadBand 
provides a unique example to study the role 
of equality during mergers because it is com-
prised of two Internet communications start-
ups that merged as equals. Management 
described the merger at both firms as fol-
lows, “This is the merger of equals. The 
merged company’s management team will 
be composed of the management teams of 
the original companies. The principle in this 
merger is ‘the best of both companies.’ The 
merged company will be registered under a 
new name (CEO, Internal Communications, 
May 13, 2001). Selecting a new name, Broad-
band, was a symbol of equality because it did 
not include components of either of the 
merged companies’ names, which would 
have belied a preference for one organization 
over the other. 
According to the booklet distributed to 
BroadBand employees following the merger, 
the organizations were “a perfect fit in 
terms of market, channels, technology, 
geography and business values” (Internal 
communication, 2001). Thus, the business 
rationale of the merger was based on an 
assessment that the technology, profes-
sional skills, knowledge, and products of 
the merging firms were synergic. One of the 
firms, Intercom, dealt mainly with small- 
and medium-sized Internet service provid-
ers and IP products, whereas the other firm, 
Extercom, worked with large institutional 
telecom companies and created multiser-
vice products. In the merger, sales and mar-
keting were joined and organized according 
to geographical regions, with each region 
responsible for the operations and product 
lines of both companies. 
Another attempt to promote a merger of 
equals was to combine the R&D units of 
each firm and develop a new product based 
on both technologies. All other operational 
units, including engineering logistics, HR, 
and finance, were also combined, with each 
of their respective managers operating as 
either joint managers or splitting the re-
sponsibilities between them. The initial 
structure, based on a functional silo model, 
was cumbersome and inefficient. The CEO 
of Broadband explained, “We decide to stick 
to the principle of a merger of equals by 
integrating the two firms completely, with-
out rationalizing the structure, product, 
sales or operation. We tried to keep various 
types of equal balances by appointing two 
managers to one post, each from a different 
company, or split responsibilities and tasks. 
Soon we learn that we are sacrificing effi-
ciency on the altar of equality. Then we 
started to rationalize everything” (personal 
communication, June 22, 2006. Regarding 
their respective cultures, the CEO of Broad-
Band explained, “When looking at it from 
the perspective of both companies, I can 
testify that both were aggressive with regard 
to marketing, sales and meeting targets, 
both appreciate innovation and technology 
and both are dedicated to their customers. 
However, Intercom was much faster, and I 
could characterize it as a typical start-up 
culture of improvisation. Extercom, which 
was also a start-up, was much more orderly 
and a red tape type of company” (personal 
communication, May 7, 2005.
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BroadBand is a NASDAQ-traded, leading 
Israeli provider of wireless broadband systems 
(WiMAX) to carriers, Internet service provid-
ers, and private and public network opera-
tors, and cellular operators worldwide. The 
company employs 445 people and in 2007 
had revenues of approximately $225 million. 
When BroadBand was created in 2001, Inter-
com and Extercom had approximately 200 
and 160 employees, respectively. At the time 
of the merger, 10% of the approximately 360 
employees, or 5% of each firm, was either 
laid off or voluntarily left the company. 
A top management team consisting of 
individuals from the two merged companies 
and an external consultant coordinated the 
postmerger integration. During the merger’s 
formative months, the CEOs of the merged 
firms co-managed Broadband, holding a se-
ries of management forums for different 
functional teams such as strategy, business 
development, finance, sales, operations, and 
R&D. BroadBand underwent several organi-
zational restructurings, which focused on ef-
forts to build common service standards and 
customer service methodologies and institute 
similar operation and R&D practices. In addi-
tion, the company continued to focus on 
developing technology and logistical and 
management tools for internal integration, 
including an intranet, a technological Web-
site, knowledge management projects, ongo-
ing quality improvements, and R&D projects 
for product and service innovations, such as 
entering the cellular market. One of the 
trademarks of BroadBand’s postmerger inte-
gration activities was frequent organizational 
change. Since the 2001 merger, major struc-
tural changes have occurred every year. 
BroadBand’s postmerger integration process 
has entailed continuously redrawing internal 
and external organizational boundaries, in-
cluding two acquisitions and changes to the 
top management team. 
Method
Data Sources and Collection 
This study was part of a larger research project 
on the evolution of the Israeli high-tech sector. 
We conducted a series of case studies aimed at 
investigating selected organizational issues in-
depth, such as knowledge, trust, identity, and 
equality. These issues are amenable to an in-
ductive study that follows grounded theory 
principles (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). In particular, studying a single merger 
in depth allowed us to collect extensive data to 
understand the dynamics of equality in a 
merger of equals. Although a single case study 
may limit generalizability, our objective was to 
shed light on the dynamics of equality in prac-
tice and not to test a theory of equality as such. 
Thus, for our purposes, the BroadBand case 
provided a unique opportunity to examine a 
merger of equals and generate new theoretical 
insights stemming from the process we studied 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007; 
Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). Furthermore, we were 
aware that retrospective descriptions of equal-
ity might involve selective reminiscences about 
the ideal of distributive equality. Such narra-
tives, which reflect the recall bias inherent in 
reconstructing past events (Baron, Burton, & 
Hannan, 1996), may also superimpose the 
present on the past. 
Our data collection occurred between 
2004 and 2005 and constitutes the basis of 
our research. For 3 months (April–June) in 
2004, the first author visited BroadBand 
weekly, completing 17 field visits. During 
2005, the first author conducted seven addi-
tional visits to interview managers to clarify 
data and collect supplemental data. We as-
sumed that the presence of premerger cul-
tures at BroadBand would still be apparent 
3 years after the merger announcement in 
2001. The premerger cultures in BroadBand 
were analyzed according to a historical narra-
tive approach (Bartel & Garud, 2009). Our 
data consist of scheduled and unscheduled 
interviews conducted with employees and 
managers during the course of our fieldwork. 
Other sources of data included BroadBand 
documents such as minutes from manage-
ment meetings, memos, and reports.
Interviews
We chose our sample by consulting with the 
HR manager who was part of the top 
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management team that planned and imple-
mented the merger. We conducted interviews 
with 46 members of Broadband including 
employees, midlevel managers, and senior 
managers. Among these, 32 interviews (17 
from Intercom and 15 from Extercom) were 
with organizational members who 
actively participated in executing 
the BroadBand merger. Our inter-
view protocol was specifically 
structured to probe issues with a 
direct bearing on creating equality 
and enacting a culture at Broad-
Band during the postmerger inte-
gration. The interviews focused 
on themes associated with our re-
search question; specifically, how 
employees of premerger firms 
construct their understanding of 
equality during postmerger inte-
gration (Kvale, 1996). We followed 
Lee’s (1999) suggestions for fram-
ing an interview by focusing on 
basic issues, such as respondents’ 
work practices and roles at their 
premerger firms compared to their 
experience at BroadBand. We also 
probed for their interpretation of 
management’s actions regarding 
equality, their perceptions of vari-
ous aspects of the merger and in-
tegration related to the idea of a 
merger of equals, and their impression of the 
changing nature of equality. We asked for 
interviewees’ stories about their work and 
how their premerger firm differed from the 
merged firm; their views on organizational 
issues such as practices, priorities, technol-
ogy, project work, and authority; and their 
assessments of their premerger firms’ work 
values and norms compared to BroadBand. 
Interviews averaged 1½ hours in length 
and were audiotaped and transcribed. We 
used an interview protocol composed of 
open-ended questions concerning the merger 
and clarified various events, organizational 
processes, and decisions. Our full interview 
protocol appears in the Appendix. We used 
follow-up probes in response to new themes 
and issues that emerged over the course of 
the interview. 
In addition, we conducted two interviews 
each with the CEOs who founded Intercom 
and Extercom. One year after the merger, the 
CEO of Extercom left the company, and the 
CEO of Intercom became the sole CEO of 
BroadBand. When the CEO of Broadband 
decided to retire in 2005, the Board of Direc-
tors appointed Broadband’s Chief Operating 
Officer (a former COO of Extercom), as the 
new CEO. We also conducted two interviews 
with the new CEO, once prior to his appoint-
ment and once after his appointment.
Documentation
In addition to the interviews, we collected 
archival data covering the years 2001–2005, 
which included documents and minutes of 
organizational meetings relating to the 
merger, as well as various pamphlets, public 
relations memos, and organization profiles. 
We also prepared a file of all newspaper cov-
erage of BroadBand and its merged organiza-
tions. Finally, we had access to the official 
merger documents, which specified in detail 
the planned premerger processes, the sug-
gested integration strategy, and plans for its 
implementation. We were also given access 
to internal reports and memos written by the 
Vice President for Human Resources, which 
documented the deliberations during top 
management joint meetings from both com-
panies. These memos contained details re-
garding the merger strategy and the reaction 
of management to daily events concerning 
the integration process. 
Data Analysis
Our data analysis followed the procedural 
principles suggested for inductive case study 
research (see Yin, 1994). This involved mov-
ing from concrete descriptions made in the 
field to more abstract and conceptual de-
scriptions, searching for meaning by catego-
rizing our data into themes. This was fol-
lowed by an iterative process where additional 
themes and patterns were culled from the 
data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We induc-
tively analyzed the data, using grounded 
methodology principles that involved coding 







of the merger and 
integration related 
to the idea of a 
merger of equals, 
and their impression 
of the changing 
nature of equality.
 CULTURAL CLASHES AND HIGH-TECH START-UPS 633
Human Resource Management DOI:10.1002/hrm
and categorizing content themes and the re-
spective interpretations that the informants 
provided (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). In analyzing our field 
notes, we first singled out both temporal and 
contextual categories, which were recorded 
chronologically. All of the data from com-
pany documents and interviews, together 
with our attached memos on possible inter-
pretations, were also coded. The coded items 
were then grouped into basic content catego-
ries, which largely corresponded to the issues 
we covered in the interviews. We distin-
guished between categories related to Broad-
Band itself and categories that contained 
data related to the respective companies dur-
ing the premerger period. Thus, three differ-
ent data sets were created. 
We then aggregated accounts of those 
events that were relevant to the major themes 
of pre- and postmerger culture, using axial 
coding to investigate the relationships be-
tween categories. This inductive process al-
lowed constructs to be extracted from the 
conceptual frameworks represented in the 
data by attributing thematic meanings to 
events and stories and mapping out relation-
ships between categorized sets of data. Next, 
we conducted cross-data analysis, triangulat-
ing between our different data sources 
 (interviews, documents, memos, official pub-
lications, and newspaper clips), looking for 
similarities between categories. Comparing 
the data sets entailed discerning patterns 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), which helped us 
identify different strategies for using the pre-
merger cultures from Intercom and Extercom. 
In the next step of the categorization process, 
we singled out core categories that reflected 
the emerging model of creating culture dur-
ing the postmerger integration process.
In the final step, we developed a more 
formal interpretation of the relationship be-
tween notions and practices of equality and 
the creating the culture at BroadBand. We 
shared our interpretations with colleagues 
and key informants at BroadBand. Their 
comments and criticisms further refined our 
interpretations and contributed insights to 
our conceptualization of culture formation 
(Locke, 2001).
Findings
Our data suggest that in mergers of equals, 
start-ups adopt a flexible approach to align 
equality with strategic and operational needs. 
Using equality in a flexible manner is crucial 
to the merger’s success. For this purpose, man-
agers at Broadband linked equality 
to the values and behaviors they 
considered instrumental to the 
company’s ability to compete in 
the volatile Internet communica-
tions market. Consequently, dur-
ing the postmerger integration, 
most of the attention given to 
equality was associated with the 
challenge of stabilizing the market. 
As BroadBand’s CEO indicated, 
“Our first and foremost objective is 
to get out of this merger with a bet-
ter foothold in the market.” 
Our data also reveal that man-
agers enacted notions of equality 
while being aware of its potential 
to serve as a raison d’être not only 
for the merger, but also for subse-
quent changes during the forma-
tive years of the integration. We 
found that this practical view of 
equality was present in three domains: (a) 
forms of justification, which referred primar-
ily to the crucial role of the merger of equals 
as the only chance for survival; (b) the notion 
of equality, which provided the groundwork 
for change from distributive to integrative 
equality; and (c) changes in equality  practices, 
which were the direct result of BroadBand’s 
strategic approach and its daily operations, 
both of which targeted repositioning the 
newly merged firm in its market. Underlying 
the changing practices and meanings of 
equality are management’s strategies of ac-
tion, power relations, and the practical needs 
of changing organizational procedures and 
routines. The following sections elaborate on 
each of these domains. 
Forms of Justifi cation
We found that both managers and employees 
engaged in justifying the merger. Management 
Our data suggest 
that in mergers of 
equals, start-ups 
adopt a flexible 
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provided a series of justifications associated 
with various aspects of the merger with the 
aim of creating the perception that Broad-
Band was truly a merger of equals. These jus-
tifications spanned four domains. First, Broad-
Band’s management presented a futuristic 
rationale for the merger by claiming that the 
merged company would become a global 
leader in its field. In this vein, the merger was 
portrayed as inevitable because the two com-
panies shared the same vision and realized 
that it could only be achieved through a 
merger. Second, managers emphasized the 
cultural fit between Intercom and Extercom. 
Various documents prepared during the pre-
merger period assessed the synergies between 
the two cultures, concluding that both firms 
had a common start-up culture consisting of 
such values as entrepreneurship, innovation, 
high motivation, technology-orientation, and 
an aggressive market outlook. Presenting the 
two cultures in this stereotypical fashion fa-
cilitated acceptance by the employees of the 
notion of a merger of equals, and managers 
considered it an appropriate tactic for smooth 
integration. As the manager with primary re-
sponsibility for postmerger integration com-
mented, “Of course, the two companies were 
culturally different. Intercom is more agile 
and improvising and quick to respond to 
changes. Extercom lacks this flexibility, and 
we knew it before the merger. However, it was 
imperative to convince people that the syn-
ergy was very high, so they can dissolve their 
individual identities fast and adopt the new 
one.” Third, managers emphasized the com-
patibility and complementary of the firms. 
Managers at both companies viewed the syn-
ergies of their technologies and markets as the 
merger’s decisive factor. The combined prod-
uct offerings covered both the low and high 
end of Internet broadband wireless utilities 
and were suitable for most carriers worldwide. 
In addition, integrating the sales channels 
and the geographic spread of the two compa-
nies promised to provide opportunities for 
growth. Fourth, managers emphasized that 
the merger was needed for both firms to sur-
vive. The merger was presented as a last resort 
against the backdrop of the postbubble crisis 
of 2000. Managers portrayed the merger as 
the only logical path to secure the wellbeing 
and prospects of the two companies. By cast-
ing the merger in terms of survival and op-
portunity, managers asked employees for a 
high level of commitment in a bid to gain 
cooperation. The memorandum sent to all 
employees following the merger stated that 
above all other factors, including product 
portfolios, technologies, sales channels, and 
cultural synergies, the “success of the merger 
depends on each and every one of us. This 
includes our integration into the new com-
pany and patience in the initial period. This 
merger is one for all.” 
Equality During Integration 
The assumption of equality at BroadBand was 
explicitly based on the notion of integrative 
equality, which implies “On balance, each 
side will gain in some areas and lose in oth-
ers” (Zaheer et al., 2003, p. 186). The top 
management responsible for the merger took 
pains to present the merger as one of equals. 
As BroadBand’s CEO elaborated, 
It is a merger of equals—we take the 
best of the two companies and reg-
ister under a new name. However, 
from a legal point of view, Intercom 
acquired Extercom and in terms of 
the proportion of equity of the merg-
er, Intercom has 55%. So why is it a 
merger between equals? Because the 
two fi rms have an equal opportunity 
to become a leader, to grow and be 
a player in the world market. It is 
among equals because we create one 
out of two rather than integrating Ex-
tercom into Intercom. 
Thus, for BroadBand’s management, the 
merger of equals was a process based on syn-
ergies that facilitated integration through 
various mechanisms of control, organiza-
tional restructuring, and creating a new cul-
ture. In this process, equality served as a tool 
to guard the rights and status of employees of 
both firms. Dani, an R&D team manager who 
experienced the merger and integration pro-
cess, explained,
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During the process we had all kinds of 
fears, mainly who will go home and 
from which company. At each point, 
each side thought that it was more 
valuable to the partnership. We knew 
it, because this was correlated with 
whose people were fi red and whose 
managers were more dominant in 
controlling the integration processes.
As this quote illustrates, personnel move-
ments, particularly exits, during integration 
provided clues about which firm tended to 
dominate the merger.
The willingness to sacrifice during the 
integration process also helped define the 
nature of equality in the merger. These sacri-
fices took two forms. First, each firm gave up 
tangible assets such as technology, products, 
sales networks, and managerial positions that 
were deemed irrelevant to or outside the core 
business of BroadBand. Second, when em-
ployees’ status and positions depreciated, 
emotional stress created a sense of insecurity, 
threat, and loss of the basis for their identity 
(cf. Vaara, 2002; Zaheer et al., 2003). As a for-
mer Extercom R&D manager claimed,
I and others in Extercom, who were 
eventually hurt by the merger, be-
lieved in it. We believed that we were 
going to be an equal partner for some-
thing new and big. We took personal 
losses, as I was actually demoted, and 
so [were] many others. But we know 
that this is the price of a merger. You 
can have duplication or ineffi cien-
cies. So someone has to give up. As 
long as we are appreciated and treat-
ed equally during our daily work, not 
being penalized because we are origi-
nally from Extercom, and now we are 
considered as weaker, I don’t mind.
This quote reflects equality from Exter-
com employees’ viewpoint, not as gaining 
an equal share in terms of giving a tangible 
asset such as equal job or authority, but by 
being partner to a joint experiment in which 
all are contributing as much as they can. 
BroadBand’s competitive advantage was per-
ceived as legitimate in exploiting the strength 
of the two parties. Equality is implied in the 
recognition that both parties had the poten-
tial to be equal. Thus, differentiating be-
tween Extercom employees, who 
were considered at one point the 
weaker party, and the Intercom 
employees, considered to be 
stronger, was considered by Exter-
com veterans as breaching the 
merger of equals idea. As inter-
viewees described, it was not un-
evenly allocated resources or 
decision-making processes that 
were considered a breach of equal-
ity (Meyer & Altenborg, 2007). 
Rather, any evolving cultural 
norms that denied employee in-
volvement or participation due to 
their former affiliation created 
the sense that the principle of equality was 
violated. Thus, equality is not a predeter-
mined and fixed value; it is fluid and changes 
according to actors’ knowledgeable actions, 
in which they react and strategize in re-
sponse to situations as they emerge (Mizra-
chi, Drori, & Anspach, 2007). Equality is 
essentially a tradeoff in which the supremacy 
of each company’s values and practices 
change according to the evolved integration 
processes and the reality on the ground. For 
example, at the beginning of the merger, 
Intercom’s values and practices superseded 
those of Extercom because Intercom’s man-
agement and consumer demand for the 
company’s products were dominant. As the 
integration process progressed, however, In-
tercom’s value as a small start-up that moved 
forward by continuously improvising was no 
longer effective. As one the R&D managers 
contended, “With the expansion into the 
mobile market and working with leader com-
panies, we have to cease improvisation and 
adapt the more stringent R&D practices and 
structured working procedures of Extercom.” 
Driven by the developing WiMAX market, 
which favored Extercom’s product mix, 
BroadBand was forced to adopt values and 
practices originated at Extercom. As Yaron, a 
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We envisioned poetic justice. We were 
promised a merger of equals, which 
soon leaned in Intercom’s favor. They 
staffed the major management posi-
tions and their products were 
on top. Things have changed 
since then. Now, Extercom’s 
values, methods, work sys-
tems, and organization of 
work are the standard—we at 
Extercom envisioned it. 
Thus, equality did not mani-
fest in a distributive form, whereby 
every aspect of the merger was 
equal (Zaheer et al., 2003), but 
rather emerged through a dy-
namic and flexible process of trad-
eoffs made over time. 
The desire to present the 
merger as equal was perhaps stron-
gest early in the integration pro-
cess. In particular, during the 
merger’s first year, management 
was balanced carefully between the two 
firms. Dor, the WiMAX mobile division’s 
manager, explained, 
When we started with cost-cutting 
and organizational changes, we be-
gan to lay off employees. Decisions 
about who to fi re were not always 
made on the best-option basis. I had 
to take into account a situation where 
I’m not too biased toward one side or 
another. In a few cases, I exercised af-
fi rmative action, just so I wouldn’t 
harm the notion of equality. 
As this quote suggests, in the early days of 
the merger, keeping things balanced was seen 
as a functional mechanism to maintain equal-
ity and superseded other functional consider-
ations. By 2005, however, the issue of balance 
no longer represented the operative mecha-
nism for maintaining equality. In cases of 
layoffs, however, BroadBand members kept 
an unofficial count of those affected from 
their company of origin. As Zvi, a former Ex-
tercom employee explained, “We are one 
company now, but it hurts more if one of 
yours is leaving. We joke about it, but we 
maintain a count, and ours is much lower 
than the other’s.” 
Equality was also maintained by creating 
the new name for the merged company. As 
the HR manager of Broadband explained, 
“Choosing a name [that] is a combination 
would surely mean playing with open nerves.” 
The sense making around the new name re-
vealed that it had the potential to create a rift 
between BroadBand employees and their 
companies of origin. Thus, retaining the 
shared meaning of equality called for both 
symbolic and instrumental considerations, 
which signaled to BroadBand members that 
they needed to cooperate in building the new 
firm. The success of BroadBand would be 
achieved through unified action, which saw 
everyone cooperating as equals. 
The hallmark of the planning for the 
BroadBand merger was to create speedy inte-
gration, which research has suggested con-
tributes to the likelihood of merger success 
(Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). This planning 
also affected perceptions of equality, as 
explained by BroadBand’s Operations 
Manager:
We divided into work groups, each 
dealing with different postintegra-
tion activities, such as choosing the 
new name, organizational structure, 
work plans, and marketing and sales, 
so people from both companies got 
to know each other and to trust each 
other. This makes them an equal 
 partner in the building of the new 
company. 
The integration process unfolded quickly, 
without much formal planning for how to 
retain equality in practice; indeed, this had 
meaningful implications. For example, it 
meant abandoning formal tools and methods 
of planning in favor of ad hoc processes that 
risked surrendering the merger to the domi-
nant firm. As Noa, an HR manager ex-
plained: 
We have laid the foundation of the 
postmerger integration, but only for 
The hallmark of the 
planning for the 
BroadBand merger 
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the fi rst act. Then, things changed 
on the ground. The reality was 
stronger than our intention. Those 
who were more proactive and consid-
ered dominant, ex-Intercom people 
took the lead and started to control 
[things]. So, soon after the merger, 
we heard voices [saying] that the no-
tion of equality is fi ction, and it is a 
simple acquisition: Intercom acquired 
Extercom. 
Any merger of equals must navigate the 
embedded differences of the two parties. 
Mergers usually bring to the surface inconsis-
tencies and conflicts that stem from the na-
ture of the two merging firms. Managers 
must attempt to understand the cultural dif-
ferences of the two parties and how these 
may affect the merger’s prospects. In particu-
lar, culture embodies shared understandings 
among organization members and is devel-
oped and shaped by the experiences of the 
members. Therefore, culture is necessarily 
idiosyncratic. Thus, integrating two cultures 
while trying to make them equals is likely to 
be difficult and can shift the postintegration 
process from one of consent to one of con-
flict. As Yaki, the logistics manager who was 
involved in the premerger process con-
tended: 
We were both communications start-
ups that share the same business 
environment, but we have different  
priorities, different way of doing things, 
different values. We realized that the 
only way to merge is by declaring our 
merger as between equals. But equal in 
what. So we decided that we are not 
 assessing who is better in what, but 
taking bold strategy, that we are equal 
in everything, technology, market, and 
the way our fi rms are managed. This 
was good for starting the process, but 
became irrelevant later. 
The new culture was to be created as a 
consequence of two ostensibly separate pro-
cesses. The first process involved inertial 
forces that retained the separate cultures of 
the merged firms. This was considered an ap-
propriate way to promote the firms’ separate 
identities, and correspondingly, the ability to 
continue to perform designated tasks, partic-
ularly product development. The second pro-
cess was a planned culture change 
as part of postmerger integration. 
This process incorporated both 
structural and procedural changes, 
as well as changes in norms and 
values. The second CEO of Broad-
Band explained: 
Once we started to operate as 
a merged company, I managed 
the routine and the HR man-
ager managed the postmerger 
integration. We more or less 
anticipated a clash of cultures at its 
best, as I had to take into account the 
ways in which the different compa-
nies were used to doing things, and 
work with that, and then work on the 
long term, trying to introduce new 
ideas and values. 
Thus, inherent in the merger, top man-
agement recognized that the integration pro-
cess would involve carefully staging legacy 
practices with the need to adopt new ways of 
working.
One of the features marking a merger of 
equals is the common agreement that both 
companies have a track record of success. Suc-
cess can blur differences between the two 
companies because the shared value of success 
serves as a strong uniting force and reduces 
tensions that stem from distinct differences in 
performance. At BroadBand, the perception of 
success as a basis for creating a merger of 
equals was also associated with willingness to 
cooperate. Members of the two companies 
described their merger as being based on equal 
ground because, as an ex-Intercom engineer-
ing manager claimed, “It is two successful 
companies with common objectives, which 
cooperatively and equally joined forces to 
continue with their past success, but on a 
much larger scale.” This was essentially the 
same rationale the two CEOs expressed, who 
stated in a letter to employees: 
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We are dealing with integrating 
two successful organizational sys-
tems. The success of the integration 
process depends on each and every 
one of us, and we are certain that 
as we knew to lead the companies 
to success thus far, we will be able 
to continue together to lead the 
merged company to the next level 
of success.
In a later letter sent to employees fol-
lowing the merger, the co-CEOs portrayed 
the rationale for the merger of equals as 
being based on common objectives, stating, 
“The merger is a result of a common under-
standing by the management of the two 
companies that this is clearly the correct 
step to take in order for us to reach our 
common objectives.” The co-CEOs stressed 
that achieving the merger objectives de-
pended on BroadBand members: “We set 
high objectives for the employees, the cre-
ation of the largest and strongest broad-
band wireless access company in the world. 
Such an audacious goal could only be 
achieved by a group of people who work 
together. You are judged individually and 
no one cares if you are from Intercom or 
Extercom.” In the merger’s initial period, 
this equality was frequently emphasized, 
though during the postmerger integration, 
this emphasis was diluted. As the current 
CEO explained: 
There is a strategic advantage to de-
scribe a merger as between equals, 
provided that you possess an initial 
good synergy and similar industry 
standing. In particular, if you present 
the merger as geared at achieving an 
audacious goal. You are dealing here 
with high-tech start-ups and your 
workers have big egos and pride. 
Once you describe the merger as be-
tween equals, people are lowering 
their defenses; you are not creating 
competition, but cooperation. Once 
you start with the integration, the 
equality should be based on equal op-
portunities.
Change in Equality Practices
Our data suggest that during the formative 
period of BroadBand, the organizations had 
two different cultures and two distinct identi-
ties. This was likely due to explicitly separat-
ing parts of the organizations during the 
merger (see Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) 
and the fragmentation that occurred during 
the process of integration. Immediately fol-
lowing the merger, BroadBand maintained a 
separation between Intercom products and 
Extercom products. Accordingly, employees 
on each side of the divide, though now all 
part of BroadBand, still did not engage with 
one another. Only later, as part of the integra-
tion of technologies and work systems, were 
employees from the two companies mixed. 
Anat, a support manager, explained the pro-
cess of culture building: 
We did it bottom-up. We started 
with small changes that were associ-
ated with the way things were done. 
We changed the culture of Intercom 
through introducing bureaucracy, 
planning, standards, and work plans. 
We changed the culture of Extercom 
by forcing their people to be person-
ally accountable to what they were 
doing, not hide behind the group, 
work with a budget in mind and more 
importantly, to realize that customers 
are at the forefront—not technology 
for its own sake.
Thus, in certain departments, Intercom 
people, who tended to think that they were 
dominant, had to adapt to Extercom work 
methods, which were based on meticulous 
planning and procedures. Erez, a product 
manager from Extercom, described the shift:
We from Extercom had a hard time 
adapting to the need to take into ac-
count a different way of doing things. 
For example, we always changed 
things while working on developing 
a product because we learned that 
there are changes in the customers’ 
demands. We did it on the job. Now 
we have review meetings; we have 
 CULTURAL CLASHES AND HIGH-TECH START-UPS 639
Human Resource Management DOI:10.1002/hrm
to work according to the procedures, 
document what we are doing and so 
forth. For me, it is the culture shock 
of the merger, moving from freedom 
to an experiment, [from] being mas-
ter on my own to being subjugated to 
rules and routines and being part of a 
team in every decision.
The perception of equality in integrating 
the two cultures was a particularly touchy 
subject, leading the postmerger team to pay 
special attention to the issue of culture (cf. 
Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988). During premerger nego-
tiation talks, a consultant who coordinated 
the process conducted a cultural survey in 
both firms and found cultural synergies. Both 
companies possessed an entrepreneurial 
spirit, pride in their accomplishments, an ag-
gressive approach to executing plans and 
business activities, and a high level of dedica-
tion and responsiveness to customers. Internal 
documents the consultant submitted to the 
boards of both firms indicated, “Both compa-
nies are of similar cultures, lean and mean 
organizations with a fighting mentality.” 
These common values, however, existed 
against the backdrop of a larger repertoire of 
the each company’s cultural characteristics, 
which also exhibited striking differences. For 
example, during the merger’s planning, the 
HR manager responsible for integrating 
the human-cultural aspects of both firms 
 created a cultural map, which outlined the 
basic assumptions and values characterizing 
each firm. The map (see Table I) identified 
the key cultural attributes of each firm and 
their meanings to members of the other 
firm. 
Nadav, a Broadband Vice President for 
R&D who hailed from Extercom, described the 
differences between Intercom and Extercom:
Extercom was more of a high-end 
telecom start-up. Working with 
T A B L E  I  Cultural Map of Intercom and Extercom Prior to the Merger
Company Values Behavior







Being fi rst with R&D and 
in the market
Meeting target by all 
means
The client is always right 
and needs a solution
Fast mobilization and 
interorganizational 
cooperation
Sloppy, tend to not 
complete assignments
Unprofessional attitude 
towards clients and 
products 
Doing before thinking
Covering up of 
defi ciencies





Working methods and 
organization
Emphasis on feasibility 
before promising delivery
Emphasis on R&D and 
strategy
Bureaucratic and infl exible
Slow to respond, hiding 
behind quality standards
Care more about 
technology than market
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is merely a symbolic gesture aimed at defus-
ing potential conflicts and smoothing cul-
tural differences (e.g., Chatterjee et al., 1992; 
Elsass & Veiga, 1994; Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999; Zaheer et al., 2003). Our findings re-
vealed that the symbolic notion of equality is 
intended to guarantee a sense that the merger 
is needed and a sense that the merger is vul-
nerable during the delicate periods when the 
merged organization is in its formative stages. 
The Chief Operating Officer in charge of the 
entire postintegration process and later 
BroadBand’s CEO stated: 
Although the merger is based on the 
prospects of success in the long run, 
by focusing on the WiMAX and mo-
bile WiMAX, still we had to “pull the 
wagon” [the merged fi rm] every day. 
This is why we have in BroadBand 
strong genes of survival. It is embed-
ded in our culture, and it doesn’t 
matter if you are from Intercom or 
Extercom, we were all equal in this 
plight for survival during the early 
days. Don’t forget, we merged during 
the slump period of the Internet and 
communications market.
Thus, as BroadBand confronted its post-
merger integration and tried to overcome the 
uncertainties of the external market, mem-
bers of the merged entity interpreted the 
merger of equals as necessary for the firm’s 
survival. Furthermore, the strategic actions 
of managers from both firms were intended 
to provide shared meanings and identities 
based on declared cultural, technological, 
and marketing synergies. These synergies 
stemmed from the notion of complementary 
cultural values, which were enacted alter-
nately and interchangeably by members of 
both firms to make sense of the merger. For 
example, Toni, a business development man-
ager, originally from Extercom, explained 
how the process of new value creation was 
associated with the former firms’ identities: 
At the beginning, each member 
was colored differently [singled out 
as  either a member of Intercom or 
l eading communication leaders, the 
company developed strict planning 
methods and very organized SOPs 
(standard operating procedures). Al-
though small, the bureaucracy in Ex-
tercom was very noticeable, in 
all walks of company life. Also, 
because they work with com-
panies like Simons or German 
Telecom, their quality control 
and product standards have 
to meet high requirements. 
Intercom, on the other hand, 
originated from the fi eld of 
IP (intellectual property) and 
worked mainly with small 
and medium telecom com-
panies, many in developing 
countries, and accordingly, 
had to be very responsive, re-
act fast, and improvise a lot. 
Intercom is very Israeli, a cul-
ture of doing before thinking, 
“everything is going to be all 
right” and lots of improvisation.
By discussing these cultural differences, 
mutual learning occurred (cf. Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999), which allowed the parties to transcend 
the differences through the commitment to a 
merger of equals. As Ram, a member of the 
cultural integration team (originally from 
Intercom) noted: 
We realized that at the end of the day 
there are big cultural differences be-
tween us. However, we also realized 
that the merger was a must, so we 
have to take the best out of the two 
cultures and build a new one. This 
can be done only if one appreciates 
the differences and sees the other as 
an equal. 
An orientation of openness, as reflected 
in Ram’s words, was a necessary condition for 
the mutual learning that was needed for the 
new organization to succeed. 
Arguments about equality in mergers 
have indicated that this type of phenomenon 
The hallmark of the 
planning for the 
BroadBand merger 




contributes to the 
likelihood of merger 
success.
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 Extercom], according to his or her 
original company. Now, company-
wise I’m colored BroadBand, but 
professional-wise I’m still colored Ex-
tercom, which means values of pro-
fessionalism and quality. Intercom 
members are also colored differently 
when it comes to aggressive market-
ing or improvisation, which was part 
of their strength, and [this] colored 
BroadBand organizationally. 
Thus, the changing business environment 
led to creating norms of equality that en-
dorsed the premerger cultural values by inte-
grating them into the new BroadBand culture. 
This pattern implies a more flexible under-
standing of the meaning of equality. It paints 
a merger of equals as new interpretations of 
premerger cultural values that were conducive 
to postmerger integration, rather than as a 
rigid system of equality in all things regardless 
of their effectiveness. The particular cultural 
values of the original firms, such as profession-
alism or aggressiveness, were reapplied when 
necessary. These values were chosen because 
BroadBand’s strategy, organization, and mar-
ket called for adapting them as part of a cul-
tural repertoire that fit the particular context 
and time of the postmerger integration.
Creating the new culture soon tran-
scended the notion of equality due to other 
considerations, which sometimes meant 
placing short-term considerations ahead of 
meeting managements’ core merger objec-
tives and promises made. Because the merger 
took place when the telecom market plunged, 
BroadBand laid off 10% of its workforce. This 
move contradicted declared promises that 
BroadBand’s leadership made and decreased 
trust between management and employees. 
As Daphne, the HR manager, explained, “It 
was difficult to get commitment to culture 
change. People lost interest in the big pic-
ture, looking at their tasks only. So immedi-
ately after the merger, we lost our innocence 
and our family start-up culture forever. I 
think this was for the better; others [are] still 
mourning.”
BroadBand developed through both in-
teractions between members of the two firms 
and management directives and decisions 
regarding issues that strongly influenced the 
company’s values and assumptions. Manage-
ment signaled its intentions and preferences 
through various actions that employees con-
sidered as the merged organization’s strategic 
course of action. For example, high value was 
placed on individual needs yield-
ing to collective needs. Ada, an 
Intercom marketing manager 
who monitored the early stages 
of the postmerger integration, 
explained:
We created new culture 
through shock waves. Of 
course, the common way 
is by letting people go. I re-
member that the biggest 
shock for Extercom people 
was the decision to let go of 
their technological genius. 
It was a strong message. We 
knew that we were losing 
one of our best and most 
innovative technological 
people. But it showed pret-
ty clearly to all, that we are 
more concerned with devel-
oping a team culture, and 
won’t hesitate to let go those 
who we think are not [a] fi t.
Surprising or not, these moves were pow-
erful ways to change employee thoughts and 
behaviors, but were also dangerous, because 
they could bring with them acute motiva-
tional problems. 
Discussion and Conclusions  
In this case study, we have attempted to show 
how and why managers use a “merger of 
equals” strategy of action to create cultural 
synergy in a new organization. In this case, 
the two parties, both technology start-ups, 
operated with different cultures, but had a 
shared understanding of their common busi-
ness environment and the meaning of suc-
cess in the pioneering domain of wireless 
 Internet. This shared understanding of the 
Creating the new 
culture soon 
transcended the 
notion of equality 
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business environment led both to decide that 
their best option was a merger of equals. This 
occurred despite the fact that each party held 
different assumptions about how 
to proceed in the new wireless 
Internet/ communications world, 
which had shaped each of their 
decisions to enter niche markets 
(institutional and small- and me-
dium-sized markets) and accord-
ingly, their types of technology, 
products, and culture. The fact 
that the merger was perceived as 
an opportunity to succeed in a 
new market through technologi-
cal innovation, rather than a plan 
to achieve synergy by merging the 
existing assets of established firms 
in a mature market, made it more 
likely to be a merger of equals. 
Thus, our case study reflects dy-
namics that may be at the heart of 
many mergers that occur in simi-
lar space, in which joining is a 
strategy for moving forward into 
new competitive space, rather 
than simply consolidating assets 
in a mature space.
According to some M&A scholars, merg-
ers of equals, at best, only pay lip service to 
true equality (Marks & Mirvis, 1997; Zaheer 
et al., 2003). In this article, we have demon-
strated that a merger of equals is associated 
with complex considerations of implement-
ing an integration strategy. BroadBand’s man-
agers offered a series of justifications for their 
decision to pursue a merger of equals, includ-
ing a new mission, compatibility and com-
plementarity of markets and technology, and 
having the best of two worlds. Portraying the 
merger as being between equals, in turn, fa-
cilitated creating a safety net for the employ-
ees of both firms, who perceived guarantees 
of continuous employment, rights, and sta-
tus as well as increasing the potential success 
of the new organization. Furthermore, por-
traying the merger as being between equals 
enabled top management to demand per-
sonal and organizational sacrifices and a will-
ingness to shed the merging firms’ identities 
for the sake of BroadBand’s new identity. 
By emphasizing the need to respond to po-
tential crises in the marketplace, the merger 
was painted as a chance for both firms to en-
hance their chances for survival. 
Thus, portraying the merger as one of 
equals signaled management’s belief in the 
commitment being made and acted as a re-
quest for cooperation, regardless of one’s or-
ganizational affiliation. Top management’s 
declaration was one of equality in everything, 
including distributive outcomes. This com-
mitment to equal outcomes, however, was 
relaxed in the merged organization because 
the expanded organizational activities and 
operations required a degree of flexibility re-
garding the way things were done during 
postmerger integration. In a sense, a new no-
tion of justice emerged, one more similar to 
“interactional justice” in which being treated 
with dignity and respect is paramount (Bies 
& Moag, 1986). At Broadband, managers and 
employees came to define justice not accord-
ing to tangible assets and outcomes, but 
rather through a sense that the cultural 
norms and values of the new organization 
appreciated the contributions individuals 
made regardless of their prior organizational 
affiliation. In particular, members of the 
merger’s less dominant organization (Exter-
com) strived to be an equal partner in the 
new organization by being appreciated for 
their professional skills (Bies, 2001; Colquitt, 
2001). At BroadBand, the meaning of a 
merger of equals rested on a sense of integra-
tive justice in which members of the new 
organization saw the merger as equal as long 
as they perceived both their premerger iden-
tity and postmerger role and activities as 
conducive to the company’s success.
A major dilemma stemming from the 
merger of equals in the postmerger period 
centered on the dynamics of integrating the 
two firms. Although management stressed 
the cultural synergy between the firms, at the 
outset the steps taken in the evolution of the 
new culture were carried out under the aus-
pices of the differences between the firms’ 
cultures (cf. Chatterjee et al., 1992; Vaara, 
2000). As the organizations merged, the ag-
glomeration of practices and systems simulta-
neously created internal competition for 
Thus, our case study 
reflects dynamics 
that may be at 
the heart of many 
mergers that occur 
in similar space, in 
which joining is a 
strategy for moving 
forward into new 
competitive space, 
rather than simply 
consolidating assets 
in a mature space.
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dominance (see also Meyer & Altenborg, 
2007; Schweitzer, 2006). Management pro-
moted a culture of agility, improvisation, 
quick response, and customer orientation, 
which were considered the dominant charac-
teristics of Intercom, as well as the orderly, 
coordinated, and planned work systems of 
Extercom. Adopting these qualities called for 
using practices of equality according to man-
agement’s strategic actions. For example, the 
premerger cultures were not only a mecha-
nism for creating the perception of equality, 
but they also helped to make sense of the 
decision to merge. And, during the post-
merger, they helped management justify de-
parting from a strategy of action based on 
distributive equality (Zaheer et al., 2003). By 
positioning the merger as one of equals, it 
was the differences—not the synergies—of 
the premerger cultures that became a shared 
and accepted mechanism for creating cohe-
sion in BroadBand. Furthermore, changing 
the meaning of equality facilitated integra-
tion by adapting both new and old work 
practices and routines (Schweitzer, 2006). At 
BroadBand, selecting the values and practices 
was based on the need to retain established 
competencies and routines, while at the same 
time building new ones according to the 
merger strategy. 
We have found that culture influences ac-
tions and practices of equality by providing a 
repertoire of values, organizational capabili-
ties, and strategies of action (e.g., Swidler, 
1986, 2001). At BroadBand, the degree to 
which employees accepted or rejected dis-
tributive and integrative equality that 
stemmed from the two companies marked 
the shift from the perception of distributive 
equality to integrative equality. In this way, 
managers pursued values that drew inter-
changeably and alternately on the practice of 
equality, allowing a new and opportunistic 
practice of equality associated with manage-
ment’s strategies and actions to emerge. Thus, 
the notion of distributive equality, which 
justified the merger, was blurred through the 
integration process. 
This article contributes to multiple is-
sues associated with culture and equality in 
mergers and acquisitions. First, it enhances 
our understanding of how and why actors 
entering into a merger of equals may enact 
a culture of equality. They may do this by 
developing new aspirations, dispositions, 
and patterns of appreciation, as well as 
practices and strategies that construct equal-
ity as an integral part of the merger. Fur-
thermore, equality can be a valuable, 
instrumental practice when the 
merger’s main task is to achieve 
market leadership. Such a goal 
requires a strategic approach 
backed by an adaptive structure 
and culture. Thus, working to 
create a new meaning of equality 
implies that social actors “are 
empowered by structures, both 
by the knowledge of cultural 
schemas that enables them to 
mobilize resources and by the 
access to resources that enable 
them to enact schemas” (Sewell, 
2005, p. 151). Second, distribu-
tive equality, which was pre-
sented as the raison d’être of the 
merger and a definitive guide-
line for the integration, may 
distract management from deal-
ing with reality on the ground. 
Once distributive equality becomes a liabil-
ity, it creates the impetus for change. These 
changes in the meaning of equality are not 
developmental, but take place alternately 
and interchangeably according to manage-
ment’s actions. Third, contrary to the skep-
tical and cynical portrayal of a merger of 
equals as an opportunist’s lip service (Sor-
kin, 2007), we consider equality as a crucial 
factor during integration. It has a direct 
impact on the strategies of action and prac-
tices during integration and reinforces cer-
tain cultural values over others. In a merger 
of equals, therefore, management brushing 
aside equality as empty rhetoric, without 
understanding how it affects the success or 
the failure of the merger, can be short 
sighted. Similarly, implementing distribu-
tive equality indiscriminately, without not-
ing internal and external changes, can be 
problematic and disruptive to the integra-
tion. Fourth, this study contributes to our 
By positioning the 
merger as one of 
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understanding of mergers of equals through 
an in-depth case study using emic empirical 
data. The data reveal how social actors 
mold the notion of equality by alternating 
between distributive and integrative equal-
ity through instituting new practices 
(cf. Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 
2001). Finally, this case illustrates the im-
portance of mergers of equals in start-ups. 
Taking into account the large failure rate 
among high-profile mergers of large corpo-
rations that were constructed as being be-
tween equals (e.g., Daimler/ Chrysler, 
Sirius/XM, Credence/LTX), studying start-
ups (or entities in continuous change) can 
provide new insights into how merger of 
equals should be carried out. 
In sum, at BroadBand equality was viewed 
as a cultural problem that continually re-
quired actors to make sense of the merger 
with premerger decisions, during the plan-
ning stages, and as frequent changes marked 
the postmerger integration. The result was a 
set of strategic actions that changed the 
meaning of a merger of equals from true 
equality to a more practical and pragmatic 
outlook—or integrative equality—that con-
sidered the interests and needs of the merged 
firm (cf. Swidler, 1986). We found that a com-
mon assertion in mergers of equals is the no-
tion of balance, which serves to buffer 
objections before and rejection during the 
integration process. Thus, in the formative 
merger period, maintaining balance between 
the two companies in areas such as layoffs, 
managerial positions, or work practices pro-
vides the firm with an effective mechanism 
for integrating. Later however, during the 
actual integration period, balance ceases to 
become a concrete tool, but still serves to 
symbolize the initial intentions of the merger. 
This is perhaps most significant when consid-
ering that an ethos of equality may enable a 
smoother integration process. 
Implications
There are three practical implications of this 
study. First, we suggest that culture provides 
a way to change the meaning and practice of 
equality in mergers of equals. For BroadBand’s 
management and employees, this entailed 
abandoning, appropriating, reinforcing, and 
inventing practices and norms that eventu-
ally facilitated a shift from perceived distribu-
tive equality to integrative equality. More-
over, culture appeared to be the key 
mechanism for building an organizational 
identity rooted in the legacy of equality that 
corresponded to management’s strategy, by 
creating a sense of belonging and recognition 
both inside and outside the organization 
(Weick, 1976). With this study, we have 
shown that presenting the merger as one be-
tween equals provides strong symbolic sig-
nals for members of the merged companies. 
This motivates their commitment to change 
and sacrifice so that the new organization has 
potential to survive. 
Second, we suggest that culture affects 
strategies of action in mergers of equals 
through the actors’ ability to apply a given 
practice of equality depending on their 
position and relative resources. Thus, the 
case of BroadBand represented the prospects 
of building a culture that was flexible 
enough to retain the equality practices and 
values of both the dominant and the less 
dominant party. This is crucial because 
eliminating equality for the sake of control 
may deprive the merged organization of a 
necessary cultural repertoire that can be 
useful later in the life of the new entity 
(cf. Vaara & Tienari, 2002). 
Third, our study implies that in planned 
mergers of equals, management deliberately 
mobilizes equality in a distinct action plan 
for smooth integration. Planning for a strate-
gic and internal fit between merged compa-
nies, however, often falls short of what 
management expects (cf. Schrader & Self, 
2003). Indeed, portraying the merger as one 
of equals serves as a preemptive measure 
aimed at reducing conflicts and creating con-
vergence, rather than divergence, of the dif-
ferent cultures. In this way, the notion of a 
merger of equals facilitates creating a new 
culture by mutually appreciating the original 
cultures. These findings stand in contrast to 
Meyer and Altenborg’s (2007) claim that “In-
stead of facilitating the social integration 
process, the equality principle led to percep-
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tual and structural fallacies negatively influ-
encing social integration” (p. 257). Our 
optimistic tone may sound naïve or idealistic. 
The onus to succeed in using equality to 
integrate successfully, however, lies on the 
shoulders of management. How to imple-
ment it, exactly, is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it represents an important direc-
tion for future research. 
Finally, future research should investi-
gate how power influences the meaning of 
equality in mergers. Analyzing power in a 
merger context takes into account the 
relations between members of the pre-
merger organizations regarding their for-
mer roles and status. Given the role that 
interactions and relationships play in 
expressing and understanding power, the 
study of mergers of equals may benefit 
from using interactional justice (Bies, 2001; 
Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 
2005) to explain how it shapes the nature 
of postmerger integration.
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A P P E N D I X  Interview Protocol
Personal details: Name, employment history, education, positions in Intercom/
Extercom, positions in Broadband, number of years of employment.
How and when did you hear about the merger?
Did you take an active part in the planning/execution of the merger? If so, please 
describe your role.
Describe the process of the merger as you experienced it.
How did the merger influence your work practices? Your position? Your status? Your 
work environment?
How do you compare the two companies in terms of their technology, practices, 
working environments, culture and employee relations?
What do you think (if any) were the constraints of the merger? Difficulties? Strengths? 
Weaknesses?
In what areas do you find synergy between the two companies?
Was this merger a “merger of equals”? In what respect(s) – please be specific.
Did you experience difficulties in adjusting to your Extercom/Intercom peers? In what 
way(s)?
Is the company “one” now or still divided? Please describe how this manifests 
throughout the merged organization.
How would you evaluate the performance of management during the merger?
Did you have enough information about the merger and its objectives? 
Is it a “successful merger”? Why? What, if anything, could have been planned 
or implemented better?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
